
Photo credit: Ben Powless
The largest civil disobedience campaign in many years culminated Saturday with the arrests of hundreds of people protesting the proposed Keystone XL pipeline. The pipeline would rapidly increase the continent's greenhouse gas emissions, so it's clearly a critical issue. But an unusual aspect of the debate has been the way both sides have cast the pipeline as a matter of national energy security -- would it make the United States more or less dependent on imports of oil from overseas? Amid the back-and-forth claims, some underlying trends in the oil industry have been poorly understood, so a few clarifications here might be helpful.
Since 1977, when then-President Jimmy Carter announced “the moral equivalent of war” to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil, energy independence has been a touchstone of American politics. Year after year, politicians pledged to reduce U.S. imports from the Middle East and to stop the flow of petrodollars to dictators and terrorists. But the imports kept rising.
Because English-speaking Canada is often considered virtually part of the United States (sorry, Canadians!), tar sands oil generally qualifies in the popular American mind as domestic oil. So the Obama administration has cited energy security as its primary justification for approving the Keystone XL pipeline. Environmentalists have fought back directly, citing a report by Oil Change International, a progressive Washington DC nonprofit, that claims virtually all of the tar sands oil sent via the Keystone XL would be re-exported to other countries. The report, issued Wednesday, said the pipeline would make the United States less self-sufficent rather than more so:
The Keystone XL pipeline would not in fact enhance U.S. energy security at all. The construction of Keystone XL will not lessen U.S. dependence on foreign oil—rather, it will feed the growing trend of exporting refined products out of the United States, thereby doing nothing to enhance energy security or to stabilize oil prices or gasoline prices at the pump.
The report singled out Valero Energy Corp., one of the largest beneficiaries of the pipeline, and said the firm was planning to re-export nearly all of its oil supplied from the pipeline in the form of diesel to Latin America and Europe. Rebutting the claims, a Valero spokesman said that the company’s “volume of exports remains relatively small” and that “the vast bulk of our products are made for domestic consumption.” He added: “the pipeline would provide a steady supply of oil from a nearby and friendly trading partner, in a manner that is more efficient than bringing cargoes of oil in by ship.”
Which side is right? Probably both, to varying degrees. Here's why:
Given the hyper-complex nature of the oil markets, any hard and fast predictions about the proportion of tar sands oil that will be exported years from now are not credible. The most reliable guesstimate probably can be found by taking a step back to look at overall industry trends. Valero’s statement did not exactly deny that any Keystone XL oil would be exported, but it implied – without saying so explicitly – that the Canadian oil would substitute for other imports. Valero probably has practical business reasons to avoid any categorical statement that the company is planning to cancel foreign supply contracts contracts in a few years’ time. No company would do that, for fear that those suppliers would find other buyers and pre-emptively end their Valero contracts before Valero is ready to switch.
Because a significant portion of U.S. diesel production is currently exported to Europe, it would indeed make sense that some tar sands diesel would be exported, as the Oil Change report suggests. At the same time, however, a weakness of the Oil Change report is that it focuses almost exclusively on Valero, which represents only 20 percent of the total pipeline production. The report makes little mention of other producers, and thus any extrapolation is weak.
Lost in the debate is the fact that the heavy Canadian oil almost certainly could not substitute for any significant amount of Middle East oil, which mainly comprises light blends. Instead, the Keystone XL would substitute for heavy crudes from Mexico and Venezuela, which represent more than 50 and 30 percent, respectively, of the heavy crude imports for the vast refinery complexes along the U.S. Gulf Coast.
The exports of both Mexico and Venezuela to the United States are primarily heavy grades, similar to the crude that will be carried by the Keystone XL. Because most refineries are set up to refine only one kind of crude -- such as light sweet or heavy sour -- and because retrofitting them is extremely expensive and time-consuming, finding the right match is important.
As Adrian Lajous, former CEO of Mexican oil monopoly Pemex, has explained, the heavy crude market is inherently regional:
Canada is the sole exporter to the Rockies and has 96 per cent of the market in the Mid-Continent. Meanwhile Mexico supplies over half of the heavy crude imported by Gulf Coast refiners and Venezuela a third. In California over 80 per cent of imports of heavy crude is supplied by Ecuador and Brazil, while Angola and Chad jointly maintain a significant market share in the East Coast, where Venezuela has a dominant position.
The Gulf Coast's supply is being upset by a rapid decline in both Mexican and Venezuelan oil production. Mexico’s total output has dropped from about 3.5 million barrels a day in 2004 to 2.5 million barrels in 2010. Mexican oil exports to the United States, now 1.1 million barrels a day, have fallen by nearly one-third in the past six years, and Mexico is expected to become a net oil importer as early as 2015.
Venezuela's oil industry is also in general decline, despite the country’s vast reserves of extra-heavy crude in the Orinoco Belt. The leftist government of President Hugo Chavez is trying to sell CITGO, its U.S.-based refiner and distributor, and Chavez has frequently threatened to stop selling oil to the United States altogether. In the past five years, U.S. imports from Venezuela have dropped by about one-third. Because of the ongoing risk of a diplomatic crisis between the United States and Venezuela that could conceivably lead to a cutoff of oil shipments, it is arguably in the common self-interest of U.S. oil firms and the Venezuelan government to disengage their relationships.
As a result of all this, the apparent logic of the Keystone XL is overwhelming – without it, the United States would confront a significant decrease in its oil imports. From the perspective of conventional national security, in the absence of any consideration of environmental impact, the United States desperately needs the tar sands oil to replace the void being left by vanishing imports from Mexico and Venezuela. It’s easy to imagine the memos that Obama has been receiving from the CIA, Treasury Department and the rest of his national security and economic security teams. In each case, the message would be simple but severe: “Mr. President, we have no choice but to approve Keystone XL.”
Yet such an argument would also be deceptive because the decrease in volume from Mexico and Venezuela is likely to be compensated by increased U.S. domestic production. As I explain in a San Francisco Chronicle article published tomorrow (Sunday, Sept. 4), new extraction technologies are unleashing a new oil boom in many areas of the Lower 48 states, from North Dakota to south Texas and from Ohio to California. Most of this new crude is expected to be light blends suitable for refineries in the East Coast and Midwest, rather than more heavy crudes for the Gulf Coast.
This new oil boom is not without its own environmental problems, but it is a potential game-changer for the U.S. economy and for American politics. The Keystone XL is only one piece of this puzzle.
In any case, there is no reason to believe that Gulf Coast refiners would use a different marketing strategy for their new flow of Canadian crude. As with their current supplies of Mexican and Venezuelan heavy oil, most of Keystone XL's supply probably would be sold to existing U.S. purchasers as gasoline, diesel, aviation and bunker fuel, petrochemical feedstocks, and the wide variety of other petroleum products that are consumed so voraciously by the American economy.